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Economic analysis of the intergenerational and intragenerational aspects of the
sustainability of social security has had a revival of sorts in recent time. At-
tention focuses on the direct impact of the population aging on pay-as-you-go
social security system. In this context, migration is regarded by many as one of
the necessary factors for the sustainability of the system, since it tend to reverse
some consequences of the aging process. The purpose of this paper is to study
how a political-economy equilibrium model, in which both migration and taxes
interact, focusing on the intergenerational aspect of social security, works in the
presence of aging.
All over the world, declining population growth rates and rising life ex-
pectancy trigger political-economy forces, which are likely to transform the so-
cial security system, as we know it. Due to these demographic changes, the
EU population, in particular, is undergoing a long term trend of ageing, leading
to a likely fall in the working population in the 25 states from 303 million to
297 million by 2020. Two main aspects of the aging process are relevant to the
political sustainability of social security systems. From an economic perspec-
tive, a rise in the dependency ratio (i.e., the proportion of retirees per worker)
increases the number of people drawing from the system; while it decreases
the number of contributors. From a political perspective, the older is the me-
dian voter, the more relevant is the pension spending in the political agenda.
These two contradicting eﬀects induced by the process of aging, which results
in higher demand for, and lower supply of, social security inﬂuence also the
political-economy debate about migration.
There is a large controversy in the economic literature regarding the overall
ﬁscal inﬂuence of migration on host economies. Some argue that the net tax
revenue generated by immigrants is not signiﬁcant because immigrants consume
much of the beneﬁts they produce- especially in terms of health care and educa-
tion. However, especially in light of the rapid demographic changes, migration
is often viewed as a policy that may come to the rescue of pay-as-you-go social
security systems, at least in the short run. This view reﬂects the fact that the
ﬂow of immigrants can alleviate the current demographic imbalance, by inﬂu-
encing the age structure of the host economy. Therefore, even if migration does
not provide in itself a full-ﬂedged long-term solution to falling birth rates and
ageing population, migration policy is considered to be one of the available tools
within a broader policy mix (such as a policy which admits immigrants based
on their skills).
2Countries more often than not enact migration quotas, which are being de-
cided upon in the political system. Thus, immigration must be viewed as an
endogenous policy variable in the general equilibrium-political economy system,
as much as the level of social security itself. The present paper assumes that
both migration and social security policy variables as endogenous. It focuses
on the pure intergenerational aspects of the migration cum social security sus-
tainability. To isolate the intergenerational aspects we abstract from intragen-
erational income transfers considerations. The basic elements are of the model
are standard in this literature. There is a pay-as-you-go social security system,
which employs payroll taxes (at a ﬂat rate) on a representative working young
in order to ﬁnance a uniform beneﬁt to the aged population. Immigrants enter
the economy when young, and gain the right to vote only in the next period,
when old. A crucial assumption, which derives the voter’s strategy, is that im-
migrants have a higher population growth rate than the native-born. Thus,
immigration is assumed to inﬂuence the age structure of the host economy, by
eﬀecting not only the current but also the future dependency ratio. Oﬀspring of
immigrants are assumed to be completely integrated into the country and have
the same population growth as the native-born. The tax-migration policy is en-
dogenously determined both by conventional eﬀect on wages, savings, etc., and
by strategic considerations, concerning the eﬀect of the current tax-migration
policy on the next period tax-migration policy. The model generates several
equilibrium types. When the current migration policy is the only state variable,
the Markov sub-game perfect equilibrium is characterized by a "demographic
switching" strategy, where the young decisive voter admits only a limited num-
ber of immigrants, in order to change the decisive voter’s identity from young
to old in the next period. This strategy reﬂects the fact that immigrants are
admitted in the host economy, because the political system is able to manipu-
late the ratio of old to young and thereby the coalition, which supports future
high social security beneﬁts. When next period capital per (native-born) worker
is an additional state variable, there is yet another channel of inﬂuence of the
current period policy variables on next period policy variables through savings.
Thus, the young decisive voter may adopt a "demographic steady" strategy,
where she admits the maximum amount of immigrant. In so doing the young
decisive voter renders a majority for the young, every period. In this case, both
"demographic switching" and "demographic steady" strategies are incorporated
in the same equilibrium.
To understand the "demographic switching" strategy, we begin with a base
line model, with no private saving traded assets, in which next period policy
3variables are inﬂuenced only by the current migration policy. The extended
model with private savings and capital accumulation includes another equilib-
rium type (in addition to the one similar equilibrium as in the base line model).
The new type features both a "demographic switching" strategy and a "demo-
graphic steady" strategy.
We characterize subgame-perfect Markov equilibrium paths for diﬀerent pat-
terns of population growth rates among the native-born and immigrants pop-
ulations. We are thus able to demonstrate that the older are the native-born
population the more likely is that the immigration policy is liberalized; which
in turn has a positive eﬀect on the sustainability of the social security system.
The paper is organized as follows. We survey related literature in Section
2. Section 3 provides analysis of the base line model, where there is no private
savings, the economy does not accumulate capital, and factor prices are exoge-
nous. Section 4 extends the base line model to include private saving, capital
accumulation, and an endogenous determination of the wage and the interest
rate. Section 5 considers the eﬀect of aging in the extended model. Section 6
concludes.
2 Literature Background
An empirical investigation of the eﬀect of the proportion of elderly people in
the population on the size of social security beneﬁt per retiree turn out not to
be signiﬁcant (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) and Breyer and Craig (1997))
and also negative (Razin, Sadka and Swagel 2002a). Bergstrom and Hartman
(2005) estimate the expected present value of beneﬁts and costs to US voters for
a small permanent increase in social security beneﬁts. In addition, they explore
the sensitivity of political support for social security and reach the conclusion
that a once and for all decrease in beneﬁts would be defeated by a majority
of selﬁsh voters. Cooley and Soares (1999), Bohn (2005), and Boldrin and
Rustichini (2000) analyze the consequences of aging in a general equilibrium
model of social security with production, which results in a rise in the size of
social security systems. Models of altruism between generations reach the same
conclusion (Tabellini (2000) and Hansson and Stuart (1989)). Analyzing the
eﬀect of interest groups on social security suggest ambiguous results. While
some models emphasize the raise in the political power of the elderly (Verbon
and Verhoeven (1992)), other models argue that aging will reduce social security,
since larger groups experience higher deadweight costs and larger free rider
eﬀects, and will thus be less eﬃcient in exerting political pressure (Becker and
4Mulligan (1998)). See also Galasso and Profeta (2002) for a survey.
Migration is often viewed as an economic force, which can mitigate the ﬁscal
burden induced by the process of aging since an inﬂow of young working age
immigrants may slow down population aging and help paying for social security.
Because immigrants often have low education and high fertility rates, their net
ﬁscal impact may be costly rather than beneﬁcial. Storesletten (2000) and Lee
and Miller (2000) calibrate a general equilibrium overlapping generations model
to investigates whether a reform of immigration policies could resolve the ﬁscal
problems associated with the aging. Storesletten ﬁnds that selective immigra-
tion policies, involving increased inﬂow of working-age high and medium-skilled
immigrants, can remove the need for a future ﬁscal reform. Lee and Miller on the
other hand reach the conclusion that since immigrants have lower education and
higher fertility rates than that of the native-born, a higher amount of immigrant
admitted into the economy will east temporarily the projected ﬁscal burden of
retiring baby boomers in few decades although its overall ﬁscal consequences
would be quite small. Feldstein (2006) argues that the common prescription of
increased immigration would do little to reduce the future ﬁscal burden, and
that the only alternative is to shift from a pure tax-ﬁnanced system to a mixed
system that supplements the tax ﬁnanced beneﬁts with beneﬁts based on in-
creased saving ﬁnancial investment. Razin and Sadka (2000, 2004) address the
issue of the ﬁscal burden associated with immigrants in a pay-as-you-go ﬁscal
system. They show that the additional obligation of the ﬁscal system to pay
pension beneﬁts to the incoming migrants, when they retire, could be shifted
forward indeﬁnitely. If, hypothetically, the world would come to a stop at a cer-
tain point of time in the future, the young generation at that point would bear
the deferred cost of the present migration. But in an ever-lasting economy, the
migrants, by supplying work and helping the ﬁnancing the pension beneﬁt of
period zero to native-born retirees, are a boon to the host country population:
old, young, and future generations.
A pioneering paper which studied immigration policy in a political economy
setup was the paper by Benhabib (1997). He examines the determination of im-
migration policies that impose capital and skill (human capital) requirements on
heterogeneous immigrants through majority voting process. The model demon-
strates that the native born population will be polarized between those who
would like an immigration policy to maximize the domestic capital-labor ratio
and those who would like to minimize it. Dolmas and Huﬀman (2004) and
Ortega (2005) add another angle to the political debate and model the joint de-
cisions over immigration quotas and redistributive tax policy. Both address the
5voting process in a dynamic set-up, where the native-born voters’ preferences
over immigration are inﬂuenced by the prospect that immigrants will be voting
over future tax policy. The paper of Dolmas and Huﬀman refers to the deci-
sions over immigration quotas and redistributive tax policy in subsequent three
periods model with diﬀerent degree of international capital mobility. The latter
paper considers a inﬁnite horizon general equilibrium model of immigration and
redistribution policies, with a heterogeneously skilled population who chooses
an immigration policy by majority vote while anticipating that immigration af-
fects the skill premium and the skill composition of the electorate. Razin, Sadka
and Swagell (2002b) show, in a stylized model of migration and human capital
formation, that low-skill immigration may lead to a lower tax burden and less re-
distribution than would be the case with no immigration, even though migrants
(naturally) join the pro-tax/transfer coalition. This is due to two conﬂicting
eﬀects of migration on taxation and redistribution. On the one hand, migrants
who are net beneﬁciaries of the welfare state will join forces with the low income
native-born voters in favor of higher taxes and transfers. On the other hand,
redistribution becomes more costly to the native-born as the migrants share the
redistribution beneﬁts with them. These models clearly dial with intragenera-
tional transfer, and not the intergenerational transfer as in a pure social security
model. The present paper will extend this growing body of literature by analyz-
ing the sub-game perfect Markov equilibria of a political-economy model, where
the political decisions regarding migration and pay-as-you-go social security are
jointly determined, focusing on the intergenerational aspect of social security.
3 A Base Line Model
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of identical individuals.
Individuals live for two periods. When young, the representative individual
works and makes a labor-leisure choice. Underdeveloped capital markets do
not allow any private savings. Social security is therefore the only means of
intertemporal transfers. When old, the individual retires, and receives social
security beneﬁts. The tax-transfer system is "pay as you go" where in every
period the government levies a ﬂat tax on the young’s wage income, which
fully ﬁnances the social security beneﬁts paid to the old. Immigrants enter the
economy when young, and gain the right to vote only in the next period, when
old. They have the same preferences as those of the native-born, except from
having a higher population growth rate. Immigrants are fully integrated into the
social security system upon arrival into the country. Oﬀspring of immigrants
6are like native-born in all respects (in particular, they have the same rate of
population growth).
We assume that the utility of the representative young individual is loga-
rithmic 1, given by:





] + βLog[bt+1] (1)
Uo(bt) = bt (2)
where Uy and Uo are the utility functions of young and old individuals, β ∈ [0,1]
is the discount factor, and Ψ > 0 a labor- disutility parameter (also equals to the
labor supply elasticity with respect to the wage rate). The transfer payments
to the old at period t, bt, are ﬁnanced by collecting a ﬂat income tax rate,
τt ∈ [0,1], from the young individual’s wage income at the same period, wtlt,
where lt denotes hours worked.
Labor is a single input in the production of a homogenous ﬁnal good. The
production function is linear:
Yt = Nt (3)
where Yt and Nt are period t output and labor supply, respectively. Com-
petitive equilibrium wage rate, which is equal to the marginal productivity of
labor, is constant and normalized to unity. A worker can be either native-born
or immigrant, perfectly substitutable, and with equal productivities. The im-
migration quotas is expressed as a certain percentage of the number of young
individuals in the native-born population, γ ∈ [0,1] 2. Labor supply is:
Nt = Ltlt(1 + γt) (4)
where Lt is the number of young individuals in the native-born population (old
people do not work).
Immigrants have the same preferences as the native-born population, but
diﬀerent population growth rates. We assume that the native-born population
has a lower population growth rate, n ∈ [−1,1], than that of the immigrant
population, m ∈ [−1,1], so that, n < m. We also assume that the immigrant’s
descendants are completely integrated into the economy and therefore have the
1Note that this type of utility function implies that there are no income eﬀects on the
demand for leisure (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huﬀman (1988)).
2A ceiling for γ is set equal to one, which means that the number of immigrants cannot
surpass the number of native born.
7same population growth rate as the native-born population does. The number
of young native-born individuals at period t :
Lt = Lt−1(1 + n) + γt−1Lt−1(1 + m) (5)
In addition, immigrants are also assumed to contribute to, or beneﬁt from,
the social security system in the same way as the native-born. Because the social
security system redistributes income from the young to the old, the balanced
government budget constraint implies:
bt+1Lt(1 + γt) = τt+1wt+1lt+1Lt+1(1 + γt+1) (6)
Re-arranging the expression yields:
bt+1 =
τt+1wt+1lt+1[(1 + n) + γt(1 + m)](1 + γt+1)
(1 + γt)
(7)
Labor-leisure decisions of young individuals are derived, as usual, from utility
maximization, taking the prices and policy choices as given:
lΨ
t = wt(1 − τt) (8)
Substituting for bt , bt+1and lt in equations (7) and (8) into equation (1), the
indirect utility functions of the young individual can be written as:
V y(wt,τt,τt+1,wt+1) = Log[
Ψ
Ψ + 1
wtlt(1 − τt)] + (9)
βLog[





t = wt(1 − τt) (10)
lΨ
t+1 = wt+1(1 − τt+1) (11)
Substituting for bt in equations (7) into equation (2), yields the indirect utility
functions of the old individual:
V o(bt) =
τtwtlt[(1 + n) + γt−1(1 + m)](1 + γt)
(1 + γt−1)
(12)
Note that the old individual prefers that the immigration quotas will be as
large as possible, because more immigration would raise the total amount of tax
8collected, and thus the social security beneﬁts she receives. The old preferable
tax rate is the "Laﬀer point" tax rate, where the tax revenues, and therefore
the social security beneﬁts, are maximized. The tax rate at that point is equal
to Ψ
Ψ+1.
The young individual prefers naturally that the current tax rate is as low as
possible, namely zero. Concerning immigration quotas, the young preferences
are ambiguous. On one hand, a larger quotas increases next period social se-
curity beneﬁts per old individual. This is due to the fact that larger quotas
increases the number of young in the next generation (some of these are oﬀ-
spring of the current immigrants) more than it increases the number of the old
(who happen to be the current young) in the next period. This is due to the
assumption that immigrants have a higher population growth rate than that of
the native-born (m > n). Thus, the number of next period old recipients of
social security increases but the total sum of next period social security beneﬁts
increases even more. This means that next period social security beneﬁts per
old individual (bt+1) are higher the larger is the immigration quotas.
On the other hand, since immigrants gain the right to vote in the second
period of their life, when old, the level of immigration quotas which aﬀects
the ratio of next period old to young voters also inﬂuences the identity of next
period decisive voter. Lowering current immigration quota decreases the number
of next period old voters less than it decreases the number of next period young
voters (because we assumed m > n). Thus, voting for a low enough level
of immigration quotas (below a certain a threshold level), would change the
identity of the decisive voter from young to old in the next period. This will
lead the current young voter which will be old in the next period, to favor the
largest possible quota (due to its eﬀect on next period transfer payments) which
yet change next period decisive voter’s identity from young to old in the next
period.
3.0.1 A Political-Economic Equilibrium
We employ a subgame-perfect Markov equilibrium of perfect foresight, as our
equilibrium concept (see Krusell and Rios-Rull (1996)):
Deﬁnition 1 A subgame-perfect Markov equilibrium is deﬁned as a vector of
policy decision rules, Ψ = (T,G), where T : [0,1] −→ [0,1], is the taxation
policy rule, T(γt−1), and G : [0,1] −→ [0,1], is the immigration quotas policy
rule, G(γt−1), such that the following functional equation holds:
1. ￿ Ψ(γt−1) = argmaxπt V i(γt−1,πt,πt+1) subject to πt+1 = Ψ(γt), where
9πt = (τt,γt) is deﬁned as the vector of policy platform, and V i is the indirect
utility of the current decisive voter.
2. The ﬁxed-point condition requires that if next period policy outcome is
derived by the vector of policy decision rules- Ψ, the maximization of the indi-
rect utility of the current decisive voter will reproduce the same law of motion,
￿ Ψ(γt−1) = Ψ(γt−1), as in 1.
The policy variables, which are the tax rate, τt, and the immigration quo-
tas, γt, have to maximize the decisive voter’s indirect utility function, while
taking into account that next period political-economy policy rules depend on
the current state variable, i.e. the current immigration quotas. Current and
future political economy policy rules , as a function of state variables must be
identical. Thus, the subgame-perfect Markov equilibrium notion states that the
expected political-economy policy function, which depends on the current state
variables, must be self-fulﬁlling.
The subgame-perfect Markov equilibrium is characterized by a "demographic
switching" strategy. Assuming that immigrants enter the country while young
and gain the right to vote only in the next period when they are old, voters
take into account the eﬀect of admitting a certain number of immigrants on the
composition of voters and their voting preferences in the next period. Moreover,
when the number of young exceed the number of old in the population, the young
decisive voter admits a limited number of immigrants, in order to change the
decisive voter’s identity from young to old in the next period and maximize the
next period beneﬁts she receives.
The equilibrium path depends on the native-born and immigrant’s popu-
lation growth rates. If the population growth rates of the native-born and
immigrants are both positive, there is a steady state with no taxation/social
security beneﬁts. If alternatively, the sum of the population growth rates is
negative, there is also another steady state, but with a certain positive level
of taxation/social security beneﬁts (the "Laﬀer point" tax rate) and full open-
ness to immigration. Otherwise, the sum of the population growth rates can be
positive and the native-born population’s population growth rate negative. In
this case, there is a "demographic switching" equilibrium path where some quo-
tas on immigration always prevails while there is an alternate period by period
taxation/social security policy, depending on the identity of the decisive voter.
In a given period there is a certain amount of taxation/social security beneﬁts
(the "Laﬀer point" tax rate) and no restrictions on immigration, while in the
next there is no taxation/social security beneﬁts and a more restrictive policy
towards immigration.
10Since immigrants gain the right to vote only in the second period of their
life in the host economy, the next period ratio of old to young voters who are
allow to vote, denoted by ut+1, is given by:
ut+1 =
(1 + γt)
(1 + n) + γt(1 + m)
(13)
Assuming that in case of a tie the old will be the decisive, the condition, ut+1 <
1, assures a majority of young individuals in the next period, while the condition,
ut+1 ≥ 1, assures a majority of old individuals. Therefore, the state variable of
the economy, aﬀects the next period ratio of young to old voters, ut+1, which
sets the proﬁle of the next period decisive voter.
The Markov Perfect political equilibrium of the baseline model and its pos-
sible equilibrium paths, which depend on the population growth rates of the
native-born and immigrant populations, can be formalized as follows:
Proposition 2 There exists an equilibrium with the following feature :
T(γt−1) =
￿






γt = − n
m if ut(γt−1) < 1
γt = 1 otherwise
(15)
where γt is restricted to be between zero and one. Under the assumption that the
native-born population growth rate is lower than that of the immigrant’s, there
are three possible equilibrium paths, depending on the population growth rates of
the native-born and immigrant population, as follows: 1. if n > 0, there is no
taxation/social security beneﬁts; 2. if m + n < 0, migration quota is set at its
maximum, and there is a positive level of taxation/social security beneﬁts (the
"Laﬀer point" tax rate). 3. if n < 0 and m + n > 0, there is a "demographic
switching" equilibrium path, where some positive level of immigration always
prevails while there is an alternate taxation/social security policy; in periods
where the decisive voter is old, the economy is fully opened to immigration and
there is a positive level of taxation (the "Laﬀer point" tax rate); whereas in
periods where the current decisive voter is young, there is no taxation/social
security beneﬁts and a more restrictive policy towards immigration.
The proposition is proved in the appendix.
The interpretation of the proposition is as follows.
If the old-young ratio is smaller than one (ut < 1), the decisive voter in the
current period is a young voter. The young decisive favors naturally a zero tax
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12rate but has two conﬂicting considerations regarding the desired immigration
quotas. One one hand, if there is full openness towards immigration: there will
be more young working people in period t + 1, and therefore, the tax revenue
that which will be collected from a larger work force and needed to support
retirement beneﬁts, will increase. The young decisive voter in period t, who
will be old in period t+1, would beneﬁt from the more generous social security
beneﬁts. On the other hand, if the immigration policy is excessively large, the
decisive voter in period t +1 will be a young voter. This voter will want to see
the tax rate in period t + 1 reduced to zero; hence no social security beneﬁts
whatsoever in period t + 1. There is a threshold level of immigration quotas,
γt = −n/m, which is exactly the level of the immigration policy that would
equate the number of old and the number of young in period t + 1. Thus, by
choosing the immigration quotas at this level, the decisive voter in period t would
ﬁnely balance the two conﬂicting forces on period t+1 social security beneﬁts,
so as to maximize these beneﬁts. Observe that this young voter’s preferable
immigration quotas is chosen strategically, aimed to inﬂuence the identity of the
decisive voter in the next period from young voter to old.
If the old-young ratio is higher or equal to one (ut ≥ 1), the decisive voter
in the next period is an old voter. This voter will naturally vote for the most
liberal immigration policy possible, because only the current social security
beneﬁts matter to this voter. The immigration quota is therefore equal to its
maximum level (i.e., one). The tax revenue is set at the "Laﬀer point", where
the tax rate is equal to Ψ
Ψ+1, because this way the current social security beneﬁts
are maximized.
There are three possible equilibrium paths depending on the population
growth rates of the native-born and immigrant populations.
The ﬁrst equilibrium path is the one where the population growth rate of the
native-born and the immigrant population growth rate are both positive; that
is, n, m > 0. In this case, the level of social security beneﬁts is zero. This is due
to the fact that for every level of immigration, the number of next period young
voters exceeds the number of next period old voters. Therefore, the decisive
voter in the current and all the following periods is the young voter, and her
preferences are for zero labor tax. The young voter is indiﬀerent concerning the
level of immigration because it has no inﬂuence on her current income, nor on
the next period decisive voter’s identity. The resulting equilibrium path is one
in which there is a majority of young voters, and the social security system is
dismantled, for ever.
13If the sum of the native-born and immigrant population growth rates is
negative, m + n < 0, the number of next period old voters always exceeds
the number of next period young voters. Thus, along the equilibrium path a
majority of old will always prevail, which validates a permanent existence for
the social security system and a maximum ﬂow of immigrants.
The third equilibrium path obtains if the native-born and immigrant pop-
ulations growth rates are: n < 0, and m + n > 0 . This equilibrium path is
characterized by an alternate taxation/social security policy over two consecu-
tive periods. Some positive level of immigration always prevails. This is due to a
"demographic switching" strategy of the current and next period young voters.
The reason is that when there is a majority of old, their preferable immigration
quota is at the maximum and the tax rate is at the "Laﬀer point". Because
m+n > 0 and the old decisive voter allows as much as possible immigrants, the
number of next period young voters exceed the number of next period old vot-
ers. Thus, in the next period the decisive voter must be the young. This voter
opts for a zero tax rate, and does vote strategically on immigration levels. This
means setting immigration at the threshold level , γt = −n/m. The identity
of the next period decisive voter will change from young to old (a possibility
of such demographic changes exists because the native-born population growth
rate is negative while the immigrant population growth rate is positive). This
creates a cycling eﬀect of an alternate taxation/social security policy, with a
certain level of immigration, depending on the identity of the decisive voter.
4 The Extended Model: Private Saving, Capital
Accumulation and Endogenous Factor Prices
The base line model assumes zero private savings; hence no capital accumu-
lation at all. In this section, we introduce private saving. This means that
intertemporal transfers are both through private savings and through the social
security system. The aggregate savings of the current young population gener-
ates next period aggregate capital. The latter is used as a factor of production,
along with the labor input in the next period. The production function exhibits
constant return to scale. Another feature of the extended model is the wage
rate, as well as the rate of interest, are endogenously determined along the equi-
librium path. Social security beneﬁts are ﬁnanced, as before, by a payroll tax
14in a pay-as-you-go system3.
The utility of the representative young individual, as before, is logarithmic.






βLog(bt+1 + (1 + rt+1)st) (16)
Uo(st−1,rt,bt) = bt + (1 + rt)st−1 (17)
where rt is the interest rate, and st is the savings of the young at period t.
The production function is a Cobb-Douglas production function which is





where Kt is the aggregate amount of capital and Nt is deﬁned as in the previ-
ous section. The wage rate and interest rate are determined by the marginal
productivity conditions (capital is assumed to depreciate completely at the end
of the period):
wt = (1 − a)(1 + γt)−al−a
t kα
t (19)




t − 1 (20)
where kt is capital per (native-born) worker. The balanced government budget
constraint is derived as in the previous section:
bt+1 =
τt+1wt+1lt+1[(1 + n) + γt(1 + m)](1 + γt+1)
(1 + γt)
(21)
The saving-consumption decision of young individuals are made by maxi-
mizing their utility while taking the prices and policy choices as given, and the














t = wt(1 − τt) (23)
The market clearing condition requires that the net domestic saving generates
net domestic investment:
3To isolate the unique role of social security, the reader can compare the equilibrium types








Solving for bt+1 from equations (21) and (22), and substituting bt+1 in equations
(16) , the utility indirect function of the young can be written as follows:





























(1 + γt)wtlt(1 − τt)(1 − f(τt+1))
1 + n + γt(1 + m)
(26)
lΨ
t = wt(1 − τt) (27)
lΨ
t+1 = wt+1(1 − τt+1) (28)
and substituting bt from equation (21) and kt from equation (24), in equations











t = wt(1 − τt) (30)
As in the previous analysis, the old individual favors a positive level of tax
rate at a "Laﬀer Point" (τ∗ = Ψ
Ψ+1), and the largest immigration quotas.
The preferences of the young, which will be discussed in the next section,
diﬀer from the baseline model as they are inﬂuenced by capital accumulation
and endogenous factor prices eﬀects.
4.0.2 Political-Economic Equilibria
The Markov sub-game Perfect equilibrium deﬁnition for the extended model is
as follows:
Deﬁnition 3 A Markov perfect political equilibrium is deﬁned as a vector of
policy decision rules, Ψ = (T,G), and private decision rule, S, where T :
[0,1] −→ [0,1], is the tax policy rule, τt = T(γt−1,kt), and G : [0,1] −→ [0,1],
16is the immigration policy rule, γt = G(γt−1,kt), and S : [0,∞)− > [0,∞), is
the saving decision rule, kt+1 = S(πt,kt), such that the following functional
equations hold:







1+n+γt(1+m) , with τt+1 = T(γt,S(πt,kt)).
3. The ﬁxed-point condition requires that if next period policy outcome is
derived by the vector of policy decision rules- Ψ, the maximization of the indirect
utility of the current decisive voter subject to the law of motion of the capital
stock, will reproduce the same law of motion, ￿ Ψ(γt−1,kt) = Ψ(γt−1,kt), as in
1.
Policy variables have to maximize the decisive voter’s indirect utility func-
tion, while taking into account the law of motion of capital and the fact that
next period decision rules depend on the state variables, i.e. the current period
immigration quotas and next period capital per (native-born) worker. Equilib-
rium paths depend on the native-born and immigrant population growth rates
(as in the baseline model) and on the initial stock of capital per (native-born)
worker.
There are two types of equilibria.
The ﬁrst type, is characterized by a "demographic switching" strategy, sim-
ilarly to the base-line model. When the decisive voter is young, she admits
a limited number of immigrants in order to change the decisive voter’s iden-
tity from young to old in the next period. The additional eﬀect caused by the
existence of savings and the endogeneity of factor price determination, is only
quantitative.
The other equilibrium type is however diﬀerent from the base-line model.
The additional state variable, the stock of capital per (native-born) worker,
plays now a crucial role. Rational voters take into account that the current
policy variables can aﬀect next period policy variables not only through the
composition of old to young voters, but also through the eﬀect on next period
capital per (native-born) worker; the additional state variable. There is another
possible strategy of the young; a "demographic steady" strategy, where the equi-
librium tax rate is a decreasing function of the capital per (native-born) worker,
and migration quota is set at its maximum level. This level of immigration
quotas renders a majority for the young in every period. The new equilibrium
of the extended model, combines strategies concerning both the old-young com-
position in the population, and the level of capital: there is a range of values of
the capital per (native-born) worker, for which the "demographic steady" strat-
egy dominates; while for values outside this range, the "demographic switching"
17strategy dominates.
In the ﬁrst type of Markov sub game Perfect equilibrium (referred to by
"demographic switching strategy" equilibrium) policy rules do not depend on
the capital per (native-born) worker state variable.
Proposition 4 There exists an equilibrium with the following feature:
T(γt−1) =
￿






γt = Min[γ∗,− n
m] if ut(γt−1) < 1




   
   
S(πt,kt,τt+1 =
Ψ
1+Ψ) if ut(γt−1) < 1
S(πt,kt,τt+1 = 0) otherwise
if
n < 0 ∩
m + n > 0
S(πt,kt,τt+1 =
Ψ
1+Ψ) if m + n < 0
S(πt,kt,τt+1 = 0 ) otherwise n > 0
(33)
where γt is restricted to be between zero and one, and γ∗ is given explicitly in the
appendix. The equilibrium paths depend on the population growth rates and on
the initial amount of capital per (native-born) worker the economy is endowed
with. There are three main types of equilibrium paths which are similar to the
previous section:1. if n > 0, there is no taxation/social security beneﬁts, and
there are some restrictions on immigration. 2. if m + n < 0, migration quota
is set at its maximum, and there is a positive level of taxation/social security
beneﬁts (the "Laﬀer point" tax rate). 3. if n < 0 and m+n > 0, there is a "de-
mographic switching" equilibrium path, where some positive level of immigration
always prevails while there is an alternate taxation/social security policy; in pe-
riods where the decisive voter is old, the economy is fully opened to immigration
and there is a positive level of taxation (the "Laﬀer point" tax rate); whereas
in periods where the current decisive voter is young, there is no taxation/social
security beneﬁts and a more restrictive policy towards immigration.
The proposition is proved in the appendix.
The intuition is the same as in section 2. Because the decision rules in
type one equilibrium do not depend on the capital per (native-born) worker,
the Markov sub game Perfect equilibrium of the base line model is essentially a
reduced form of this equilibrium. The equilibrium paths depend on the native-
born and immigrant’s population growth rates as in the baseline model, but
naturally are also quantitatively inﬂuenced by the amount of initial stock of
18capital per (native-born) worker. The larger the initial stock of capital, the
higher is the amount of capital accumulated every period.
The second type of Markov Perfect equilibrium of the extended model (re-
ferred to as "combined strategy" equilibrium) is speciﬁed as follows:
Proposition 5 Under several conditions on the parameters of the model, which
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if ut(γt−1) < 1
S(πt,kt,τt+1 = τ(kt+1)) if kt∈ [g(F(τ1)),g(F(τ1))]
S(πt,kt,τt+1 = 0) otherwise
otherwise
if
m + n > 0
∩ n < 0
S(πt,kt,τt+1 = Ψ
1+Ψ) if m + n < 0
S(πt,kt,τt+1= τ(kt+1)) if kt∈[F(τ1),F(τ1)]
S(πt,kt,τt+1 = 0) otherwise
otherwise n > 0
(36)
where x = 1 +
(1+Ψ)αβ
Ψ+α and g(F), F(τ) and τ1 are given in the appendix. The
equilibrium tax rate, τ(kt), is a decreasing function in kt. The equilibrium paths,
depends on the native-born and immigrant population growth rates and on the
initial capital the economy is endowed with: 1. if n > 0 and ko ∈ [F(τ1),F(τ1)],
there is a "demographic steady" equilibrium path, characterized by a positive tax
rate which depends on the capital per (native-born) worker state variable and
migration quota is set at its maximum. If ko / ∈ [F(τ1),F(τ1)], there are at least
few periods in which there is no taxation/social security beneﬁts and there are
some restrictions on immigration. 2. if m + n < 0, migration quota is set
at its maximum, and there is a positive level of taxation/social security beneﬁts
(the "Laﬀer point" tax rate). 3. if n < 0 and m + n > 0, there is a range of
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4, for which there is a "demographic steady" equilibrium path, characterized
by a positive tax rate which depends on the capital per (native-born) worker state
variable and no restrictions on immigration. If ko is not in this range, there
are at least few periods in which there is a "demographic switching" equilibrium
path, characterized by an alternate taxation/social security policy where some
positive level of immigration always prevails; in periods where the decisive voter
is old, the economy is fully opened to immigration and there is a positive level
of taxation (the "Laﬀer point" tax rate); whereas in periods where the current
decisive voter is young, there is no taxation/social security beneﬁts and a more
restrictive policy towards immigration.
The proposition is proved in the appendix.
The additional equilibrium path in the extended model are characterized by
diﬀerent optimal strategy of the young, depending on the values of the capital
per (native-born) worker: for a range of values of the capital per (native-born)
worker state variable the decision rules of the young decisive voter do not change
the next period decisive voter’s identity, while for other values of the capital per
native-born work force the "demographic switching" strategy is still optimal.
When the "demographic steady" strategy is optimal, the tax rate depends neg-
atively on the amount of capital per (native-born) worker and there are no
restrictions on immigration.
The equilibrium tax rate of the "demographic steady" strategy, is a decreas-
ing function of capital per (native-born) worker. This is due to the fact that
there are two conﬂicting forces of the eﬀect of the next period tax rate on next
period capital per native-born workers. On one hand, a higher tax rate in the
next period raises future social security beneﬁts. Larger beneﬁts, tend to reduce
current savings. This would cause a reduction in next period capital per native-
born work force ("Eﬀect One"). On the other hand, a higher next period tax
rate tend to decrease the amount of hours worked next period which lowers the
next period interest rate and social security beneﬁts. The consequent fall in the
current young future income induces more savings. This tends to increase next
period capital per (native-born) worker ("Eﬀect Two"). Since "Eﬀect One" is
stronger than "Eﬀect Two", the tax rate is decreasing in the amount of capi-
tal per (native-born) worker 5. There are no restrictions on immigration since
larger immigration quotas has an additional positive eﬀect on the indirect utility
4The range is deﬁned as follows: if there is a majority of old (i.e. uo ≥ 1) the range of
the initial capital per (native born) worker is: [g(F(τ1)),g(F(τ1))]; otherwise, the range is:
[F(τ1),F(τ1)].
5This equilibrium property of the tax function, is already noted by Forni (2005).
20of the young. Due to the fact that "Eﬀect One" is stronger than "Eﬀect Two",
larger immigration quotas which increase next period tax rate (since it decreases
next period capital per (native-born) worker6), raise next period future social
security beneﬁts. This additional positive eﬀect of immigration quotas on the
indirect utility of the young raises the preferable immigration quotas leading to
no restriction on immigration.
The reason for the additional strategy (i.e. the "demographic steady" strat-
egy) in the "combined strategy" equilibrium, results from the additional state
variable- the capital per (native-born) worker, which inﬂuences next period pol-
icy variables. When the capital per (native-born) worker is an additional state
variable, the decisive young voter does not have to engage in a strategy of inﬂu-
encing next period policy variables only by changing next period decisive voter’s
identity through immigration quotas (meaning by admitting a limited amount
of immigrants). Because both current policy variables, the tax and the migra-
tion quota, inﬂuence the amount of capital per (native-born) worker; which, in
turn, inﬂuences next period policy variables. Moreover, the young can use the
"demographic steady" strategy (instead of the "demographic switching" strat-
egy), which is optimal for low enough capital per (native-born) worker7. This is
due to the fact that low capital per (native-born) worker adds a positive eﬀect
on the indirect utility of the young in the case of the "demographic steady"
strategy: it decreases the current wage income of the young which by reduc-
ing the amount of next period capital per (native-born) worker, leads to an
increase in the next period tax rate and beneﬁts (since "Eﬀect One" is stronger
than "Eﬀect Two"). This raises the young future income, meaning that for low
enough capital per (native-born) worker the "demographic steady" strategy is
the dominant strategy.
The equilibrium paths depend on the population growth rates and the amount
of capital per (native-born) worker:
1. The population growth rates of the native-born and immigrant popula-
tions are positive, n, m > 0. In this case, the number of next period young
6A larger immigration quotas increases the number of young who save leading to higher
aggregate capital accumulation in the next period. But since we assumed that m > n,
immigration quotas increases even more the number of next period young. Thus the amount
of next period capital per native-born work force decreases.
7The reason that the "demographic steady" strategy is optimal for a closed range of capital
per (native born) worker instead of every capital per (native born) worker lower than some
threshold, is that the tax rate is assumed to be positive and smaller than one. Since the tax
rate is a function of the capital per (native born) worker, it means that the capital per (native
born) worker should also be in a speciﬁc range (see the second part of the proof in appendix
III).
21voters exceeds the number of next period old voters, which means that the de-
cisive voter is always young. Therefore, if the initial capital per (native-born)
worker is in the range [F(τ1),F(τ1)], there is a "demographic steady" equi-
librium path, where the optimal strategy of the young is always to vote for no
restrictions on immigration and a positive tax rate which depends on the capital
per (native-born) worker. If the initial capital is not in the range [F(τ1),F(τ1)],
zero tax rate and a positive immigration quotas are chosen by the young. Cap-
ital evolves in a way that it is possible to have a period where the amount of
capital per (native-born) worker enters the range [F(τ1),F(τ1)]; if it does, from
then on the current young again vote for no restrictions on immigration and a
tax rate which depends on the capital per (native-born) worker.
2. If the sum of the population growth rates is negative, n < 0, then the
number of old voters always exceeds the number of young voters. This means
that the decisive voter is always old. In that case the old sets the tax rate at
the "Laﬀer point", and no restrictions on immigration.
3. If the sum of the population growth rates is positive, but the native-
born population growth rate is negative, n < 0 and m + n > 0, there are two
possible equilibrium path types. If the initial capital per (native-born) worker is
in a certain range (deﬁned in the proposition), there is a "demographic steady"
equilibrium path where the optimal strategy of the young is to set a tax rate
that depends on the capital per (native-born) worker, and to set no restrictions
on immigration. If the initial capital per (native-born) worker is outside this
range, there is a "demographic switching" equilibrium path where some level of
immigration always prevails and there is an alternate taxation policy. Capital
evolves over time in a way that there could be a period where the capital per
(native-born) worker enters the relevant range; Once in this range, the optimal
strategy of the young is to set a tax rate that depends on the capital per (native-
born) worker, and to set no restrictions on immigration.
5 The Eﬀect of Aging
We are now in position to conduct a comparative dynamics across demographic
regimes. We analyze the eﬀect of aging of the native born population on the
size of the social security system and on immigration restrictions. Aging of
the population is speciﬁed by a reduction in the population growth rate of the
population (life expectancy is assumed to be exogenously ﬁxed).
Proposition 6 1. Aging of the native born population can move the system to
22an equilibrium path with a certain level of taxation/social security beneﬁts (the
"Laﬀer point" tax rate) and no restrictions on immigration.
2. The aging of the native-born population enlarges immigration quotas set
by the young in the "demographic switching" equilibrium path, while decreasing
the tax rate in the "demographic steady" equilibrium path.
3. In the "combined strategy" equilibrium, aging can move the system from
a "demographic switching" equilibrium path to "demographic steady" equilibrium
path; or vise versa.
The intuition of the result is as follows. Sharp aging trend of the native-born
population, can move the system to an equilibrium path where the sum of the
population growth rates are negative, n + m < 0. In this case, the old are in
the majority every period. The old liberalize immigration policy as much as
possible and sustain the social security system by setting the tax rate at the
"Laﬀer point".
Aging of the native-born population increases the political-economy deter-
mined immigration quota when the young is in the majority. This quota,
γt = Min[γ∗,− n
m], is what is chosen by the current young in the "demographic
switching" equilibrium path . The eﬀect of aging of the native-born population
on immigration policy works itself out through the ratio of old to young voters
in the next period, ut+1 =
(1+γt)
(1+n)+γt(1+m). This dependency ratio eﬀects the
political-economy quota as follows: in the case where γt = − n
m, the depen-
dency ratio eﬀects the quota through the identity of next period decisive voter;
whereas in the case where γt = γ∗, the dependency ratio eﬀect goes through
next period capital per (native born) worker (this results from the fact the ef-
fect of the quotas on the ratio, ut+1: larger quota increases the amount of total
savings but since there are also more young in the next period, it has the overall
eﬀect of decreasing the capital per (native born) worker)). Since a larger quota
decreases the ratio of next period old to young voters (it increases the number
of next period immigrant descendants more than the number of next period
old immigrant), it will decrease the ratio of next period old to young voters
less the lower is the native born population growth rate. Thus, aging has the
overall eﬀect of raising the optimal immigration quota of the young voter in the
"demographic switching" equilibrium path.
Aging of the native-born population also decreases the tax rate set by the
young in the "demographic steady" equilibrium path, τ(kt). This is due to the
fact that aging increases total savings which raises the amount of capital per
(native-born) worker. Since the tax rate is a decreasing function of the capital
per (native-born) worker state variable, the aging of the native-born population
23decreases the optimal tax rate in the "demographic steady" equilibrium path.
Aging aﬀects the capital per (native-born) worker, and thus can move the
system from the "demographic switching" equilibrium path to the "demographic
steady" equilibrium path or vise versa, since the equilibrium paths are deﬁned
over a closed range of the capital per (native-born) worker state variable.
6 Conclusion
In the political debate people express the idea that immigrants are good because
they can help pay for the old. We analyze a political economy mechanism
whereby the older are the native-born population the more likely is that the
immigration policy is liberalized; which in turn has a positive eﬀect on the
sustainability of the social security system.
For this purpose we develop an OLG political economy model to explore
how immigration policy and a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security system are
jointly determined. The pay-as-you-go social security system employs payroll
taxes on the working young in order to ﬁnance a social-security beneﬁt to the
aged. Immigrants enter the economy when young, and gain the right to vote only
in the next period, when old. Except from having a higher population growth
rate, they have the same preferences and contribute to and beneﬁt from the
welfare state in the same way as the native-born. Their oﬀspring are assumed
to be completely integrated into the country and have the same population
growth as the native-born.
The model is a political economy model where the political decisions regard-
ing labor taxation and immigration quotas are taken simultaneously, through
majority voting. Markov sub-game perfect political equilibria of the game fea-
ture a dynamic of repeated voting where individuals are forward looking, in the
sense that they take into account the eﬀect of their current voting on the next
period voting decisions. The Markov sub-game perfect equilibria depend on the
state variables. When the immigration quotas is the only state variable, voters
engage in a "demographic switching" strategy in the sense that under the as-
sumption that immigrants gain the right to vote only in the next period when
they are old, voters take into account the eﬀect of admitting a certain number
of immigrants on the composition of voters and their voting preferences in the
next period. Moreover, when the number of young exceeds the number of old,
the young, who is then the decisive voter, admits a limited number of immi-
grants, in order to manipulate next period decisive voter’s identity, switching
from young to old. In so doing the voter maximizes her next period beneﬁts.
24When there is an additional state variable- the stock of capital per (native-born)
worker, there is another channel of inﬂuence on next period political-economy
policy variables. There can be another possible strategy of the young, a "de-
mographic steady" strategy, where she chooses to admit the maximum amount
of immigrant, and in so doing she renders a majority of young every period. In
this case, both "demographic switching" and "demographic steady" strategies
are incorporated creating a "combined strategy" equilibrium.
An interesting extension could be to introduce heterogeneity within the
native-born and the immigrant’s population in terms of labor productivity. This
would bring into the current model intragenerational distribution aspects. In
addition it would also create other possible types of representative voters i.e. old
native-born/ immigrants and young native-born/ immigrants voters, which can




Proof. We must show that the vector of policy decision rules, Ψ = (T,G), as
deﬁned in the proposition, satisﬁes the equilibrium conditions:
1. ￿ Ψ(γt−1) = argmaxπt V i(γt−1,πt,πt+1), subject to πt+1 = Ψ(γt).
2. ￿ Ψ(γt−1) = Ψ(γt−1).
If ut ≥ 1, then the decisive voter is old. Substituting for lt from equation




Ψ[(1 + n) + γt−1(1 + m)](1 + γt)
(1 + γt−1)
(37)
It is straightforward to show that V o(γt−1) is maximized by setting πt =
( Ψ
Ψ+1,1).
If ut < 1, then the decisive voter is young. From equation (9), the utility of




















In that case V y(γt−1) is maximized by setting πt = (0,− n
m). It should be noted
that in the case where the population growth rates are both positive, m, n > 0,
25then for every immigration quota there is a majority of young in every period,
and thus the young decisive voter in every period will be indiﬀerent between all
possible immigration quota levels.
7.2 Proposition II:
Proof. We must show that the vector of policy decision rules, Ψ = (T,G),
satisﬁes the following equilibrium conditions:
1. ￿ Ψ(γt−1) = argmaxπt V i(γt−1,πt,πt+1), subject to πt+1 = Ψ(γt).







1+n+γt(1+m) , with τt+1 = T(γt).
Consider ﬁrst the case where there is a majority of old in period t, i.e. ut ≥ 1.
Using the fact that,
wtlt(1 − τt) =
￿
(1 − α)kα





1 + rt = α
￿
(1 − α)k−Ψ
t (1 + γt)Ψ(1 − τt)
￿ 1−α
Ψ+α (40)




















It is can be proved that V o(γt−1,kt) is maximized by setting πt = ( Ψ
Ψ+1,1).
Consider next the case where there is a majority of young in period t, i.e.
ut < 1. Substituting for wtlt(1−τt) and 1+rt+1 from equations (39) and (40),
the utility of the young voter subject to: πt+1 = Ψ(γt), can be written in the
Lagrangian form, in the following way:
L =
￿
L(kt) with πt+1 = (0,Min[γ∗,− n
m]) if ut+1< 1
L(kt) with πt+1 = ( Ψ
Ψ+1,1) otherwise
(42)







+ βLog(β), λ1 is the Lagrangian multiplier,
and L(kt) is deﬁned as follows:
L(kt) =

    
    
A + (1 + β)Log[
￿
(1 − α)kα























26As a ﬁrst step, it is easy to prove that the indirect utility of the young subject
to constant next period policy variables, is maximized by setting: πt = (0,γ∗),
where γ∗ ∈ [0,1] is deﬁned as follows:
γ∗ =
β(1 − α)Ψ(n − m) + α(1 + Ψ)(1 + n)x
−α(1 + Ψ)(1 + m)x
(44)
We will prove that in the case where m + n > 0 and n < 0, the indirect
utility of the young V y(γt−1,kt) is maximized by πt = (0,Min[γ∗,− n
m]) 8. If
γ∗ ≤ − n
m , then it is suﬃcient to prove that the indirect utility of the young is
higher by setting πt+1 = ( Ψ
Ψ+1,1) than by setting πt+1 = (0,γ∗). It is easy to
see that the higher is next period immigration quota the higher is the indirect
utility of the young since it increases next period interest rate. Regarding the
next period tax rate, it is suﬃcient to prove that:
















due to the fact that the following holds,












Deﬁne the function: d(Ψ) = Log[
￿




























Since this derivative is positive for every Ψ > 0, and for Ψ = 0 the function is
equal to zero (d( Ψ = 0)= 0), then d(Ψ) is positive for every Ψ > 0.
Otherwise, if γ∗ > − n














































8If the population growth rates are both positive, m,n > 0, then it is straightforward to
see that V y(γt−1,kt) is maximized by πt = (0,Min[γ∗,− n
m]).































it is suﬃcient to prove that,
βLog
￿
1 + n − n
m(1 + m)













Substituting γ∗ from equation (44) into equation (50), we can rewrite the in-












α(1 + Ψ)x 1
m
(51)
Since this expression is positive, it completes the proof that V y(γt−1,,kt) is
maximized by setting πt = (0,Min[γ∗,− n
m]).
7.3 Proposition III:
Proof. The proof will consist of two parts. The ﬁrst part will prove that
when there is a majority of young voters the policy decisions for the tax rate
and immigration quotas stated maximizes the young indirect utility function,
under the assumption that next period decisive voter is young. The second part
will complete the proof and show that under certain conditions on the models
parameters, the vector of policy decision rules as deﬁned in the proposition,
satisﬁes the equilibrium conditions.
The ﬁrst part of the proof:
We follow the proof of Forni (2004) to derive the policy decision rules. The
policy decision rules are obtained by using as a constraint the ﬁrst derivative
with respect to the policy variables of the logarithm of the capital accumulation












γt = 1 (53)
where x = 1 +
(1+Ψ)αβ
Ψ+α ,and c is a positive constant of integration. The policy
decision rule of the immigration quotas is at its maximal value, and the policy
decision rule of the tax rate is implicitly given in equation (52). Deﬁne the
28following function: F(τ) =
￿
(1 + 1−α






, thus we can
rewrite the policy decision rule of the tax rate as: F(τt) = kt. The function
F(τ) is decreasing in τ, for τ ∈ [0,τ], where τ =
Ψ(1+β)+α
Ψ(1+β)+α+β, and increasing in
τ, for τ ∈ [τ,1]. Thus, according to equation (52), for every value of capital per
(native-born) worker, kt, there are two solutions for τ(kt) in the range [0,1).
The solution which satisﬁes the equilibrium conditions, which is denoted by
τ(kt), is decreasing in kt for kt ∈ [F(τ),F(0)].
The solution for the policy variables given in equations (52) and (53), will
be proved to satisfy the ﬁrst order conditions of the problem. Substituting for
wtlt(1−τt) and 1+rt+1 from equations (39) and (40), the young voter’s indirect
utility function under the assumption that next period decisive voter is young,
which sets next period policy decision rules for the tax rate and immigration
quotas to be τt+1 = τ(kt+1),and γt+1 = 1 respectively, can be written in its
Lagrangian form as follows:


























−λ2(τt − 1) − λ3(−τt) − λ4(γt − 1) − λ5(γt)
(54)





































































(1 + γt)wtlt(1 − τt)(1 − f(τ(kt+1))
1 + n + γt(1 + m)
(58)
τt − 1 ≤ 0, λ2 ≥ 0 and λ2(τt − 1) = 0 (59)
−τt ≤ 0, λ3 ≥ 0 and λ3(−τt) = 0 (60)
γt − 1 ≤ 0, λ4 ≥ 0 and λ4(γt − 1) = 0 (61)
−γt ≤ 0, λ5 ≥ 0 and λ5(γt) = 0 (62)












1 + n + γt(1 + m)
￿
−λ4+λ5= 0 (64)
Since we have assumed that m > n from equation (64) we derive that γt has a
corner solution. The solution for the tax rate, on the other hand, τt, may be
bounding or not, meaning that τt = τ(kt) ∈ [0,1]9. Substituting the solutions
for the tax and openness rate into the indirect utility of the young, we obtain
that the optimal solution for the openness rate is γt = 1.
The optimal solutions should also satisfy the second order suﬃcient condi-
tion, meaning that the bordered Hessian of the Lagrangian should be negatively
deﬁned. Since the solution of the immigration quotas is a corner solution where
the largest immigration quota maximizes the young voter’s indirect utility func-




















where gτ and gk are the derivatives of the constraint of the capital per (native-
born) worker from equation (58) with respect to τt and kt+1 respectively. The
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α (1 − τt)−
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Denote by [τ1,τ2] the range of the tax rate for which the bordered Hessian of
the Lagrangian is negatively deﬁned. The optimal solution for the tax rate,
τ(kt), is in the range kt ∈ [F(τ1),F(τ1)], where the function F(τ) is decreasing
in τ.
The second part of the proof:
As in the proposition II, we must show that the vector of policy decision
rules, Ψ = (T,G), satisﬁes the equilibrium conditions (the only diﬀerence is
that the policy decision rules, Ψ(γt−1,kt), depend not only on the previous
immigration policy but also on the current capital per (native born) worker).
9Note that the utility with τt = 1 is equal to minus inﬁnity. Thus, the range for the tax
rate is [0,1).
30If the population growth rates satisfy the properties: m + n > 0 and n < 0.
Consider ﬁrst the case where there is a majority of old in period t, i.e. ut ≥ 1.
The utility of the old voter is the same as in the previous proposition and thus
V o(γt−1,kt) is maximized by setting: πt = ( Ψ
Ψ+1,1). But unlike the previous
proposition the saving of the young in period t also depends on next period policy
variables. Thus, for kt ∈ [g(F(τ1)),g(F(τ1))], the aggregate saving decision rule
should follow: S(kt,πt = ( Ψ
Ψ+1,1),τt+1 = τ(kt+1)). Otherwise, the aggregate
saving decision rule should follow: S(kt,πt = ( Ψ
Ψ+1,1),τt+1 = 0). Since the
derivative of next period capital per (native born) worker (deﬁned according to
the ﬁrst aggregate saving decision rule) by kt can be either negative or positive,
the ﬁrst condition will require that the derivative will be positive, meaning that
the tax rate should be in the range τ ∈ [τ1,τ1] ⊆ [τ1,τ], where τ1 = Ψ
Ψ+1.










2 + n + m
(1 − f(τ(y)))
￿













Thus, for kt ∈ [g(F(τ1)),g(F(τ1))], next period policy variables are set ac-
cording to: πt+1 = (τ(kt+1),1) and the aggregate saving decision rule follows:
S(kt,πt = ( Ψ
Ψ+1,1),τt+1 = τ(kt+1)). Note that for kt ∈ [g(F(τ1)),g(F(τ1))]c
the decision rule of the tax rate τt(kt) is outside the relevant range, [τ1,τ1].
Therefore the solution would imply setting the constrained, meaning either
τ = τ1 or τ = τ1.The required condition is that setting the constrained would
yield the aggregate saving decision rule: S(kt,πt = ( Ψ
Ψ+1,1),τt+1 = 0).
Consider next the case where there is a majority of young in period t, i.e.
ut < 1. If kt ∈ [F(τ1),F(τ1)], we must prove that the indirect utility of
the young voter is maximized by the "demographic steady" strategy, mean-
ing: πt = Ψ(τ(kt),1) and the aggregate saving decision rule follows: S(kt,πt =
(τ(kt),1),τt+1 = τ(kt+1)). Otherwise, If kt ∈ [F(τ1),F(τ1)]c, we must prove
that the indirect utility of the young voter is maximized by the "demographic
switching" strategy, meaning: πt = (0,Min[γ
∗,− n
m]) and the aggregate saving




for wtlt(1 − τt) and 1 + rt+1 from equations (39) and (40), the young voter’s





L(kt) with πt+1 = (τ(kt+1),1) if kt+1∈[F(τ1),F(τ1)]




L(kt) with πt+1 = ( Ψ
Ψ+1,1) otherwise
31where L(kt) is as deﬁned in equation (43). The ﬁrst part of this proposi-
tion, proved that if next period decision rules are set according to the "de-
mographic steady" strategy, and the capital per (native-born) worker is in the
range: [F(τ1),F(τ1)], then the optimal solution for the young is πt = (τ(kt),1).
In addition, we have shown in proposition II, that under the assumption that









the young voter’s indirect utility function is maximized by the "demographic
switching" strategy: πt = (0,Min[γ
∗,− n
m]). Therefore we must show that if
kt ∈ [F(τ1),F(τ1)], the value of the young voter’s indirect utility function is
higher under the "demographic steady" strategy. Since the value of the young
voter’s indirect utility function under the "demographic steady" strategy is con-
stant in kt ∈ [F(τ1),F(τ1)], and the value of the young voter’s indirect util-
ity function under the "demographic switching" strategy is increasing in kt,
the value of the young voter’s indirect utility function under the "demographic
steady" strategy must not be lower than the "demographic switching" strategy












































In addition, we must require that if kt ∈ [F(τ1),F(τ1)], then also the aggregate
saving decision rule, S(kt,πt = (τ(kt),1),τt+1 = τ(kt+1)) ∈ [F(τ1),F(τ1)]. The
derivative of next period capital per (native born) worker (deﬁned according
to this aggregate saving decision rule) by kt is positive for kt ∈ [F(τ1),F(τ1)].







2 + n + m
￿
(1 − α)(F(τ1))










2 + n + m
￿
(1 − α)(F(τ1))




Denote by k1,k1 ∈ [F(τ1),F(τ1)], the solutions of equations: h2(k1) = 0
and h1(k1) = 0 respectively. Thus, the required condition is that [k1,k1] ⊆
32[F(τ1 ),F(τ1)]. Under this condition, if kt ∈ [F(τ1 ),F(τ1)], the indirect utility
of the young voter is maximized by the "demographic steady" strategy and the
aggregate saving decision rule follows: S(kt,πt = (τ(kt),1),τt+1 = τ(kt+1)) ∈
[F(τ1),F(τ1)]. For kt ∈ [F(τ1 ),F(τ1)]
c, the value of the young voter’s indirect
utility function is not lower under the "demographic switching" strategy than
under the "demographic steady" strategy (since for τt ∈ [τ1,τ1]
c, the solution
would imply setting the constrained). Thus, if kt ∈ [F(τ1 ),F(τ1)]
c, the in-
direct utility of the young voter is maximized according to the "demographic
switching" strategy: πt = (0,Min[γ∗,− n
m]) and the aggregate saving decision
rule follows: S(kt,πt = (0,Min[γ∗,− n
m]),τt+1 = Ψ
Ψ+1). It should be noted that
since the optimal solution changes next period decisive voter from young to old,
for all values of kt+1(deﬁned according to this aggregate saving decision rule:
S(kt,πt = (0,Min[γ∗,− n
m]),τt+1 = Ψ
Ψ+1)), there are no additional conditions
on kt+1. These conditions are suﬃcient to assure that the equilibrium conditions
are satisﬁed when: m + n > 0 and n < 0.
If the population growth rates satisfy the properties: n,m > 0, there is a
majority of young in every period.
If kt ∈ [F(τ1),F(τ1)], we must prove that the indirect utility of the young
voter is maximized by setting: Ψ(τ(kt),1) and the aggregate saving decision rule
follows: S(kt,πt = (τ(kt),1),τt+1 = τ(kt+1)). Otherwise, If kt ∈ [F(τ1),F(τ1)]c,
we must prove that the indirect utility of the young voter is maximized by set-
ting: πt = (0,γ∗) and the aggregate saving decision rule follows: S(kt,πt =
(0,γ∗),τt+1 = 0). The young voter’s indirect utility function can be written in
its Lagrangian form as follows:
L =
L(kt) with πt+1 = (τ(kt+1),1) if kt+1∈[F(τ1),F(τ1)]
L(kt) with πt+1 = (0,γ∗) otherwise
(73)
where L(kt) is as deﬁned in equation (43). Note that the immigration quota
is not restricted (γt = γ∗), since the young decisive voter cannot change next
period decisive voter from young to old. According to proposition II, the in-
direct utility of the young subject to constant next period policy variables, is
maximized by setting: πt = (0,γ∗). Thus, similarly to the previous case, we will
require that the value of the young voter’s indirect utility function under the ﬁrst
decision rule (πt = (τ(kt),1)), should not be lower than the value of the young
voter’s indirect utility function under the second decision rule (πt = Ψ(0,γ∗))









































The same conditions as before are required, meaning that [k1,k1] ⊆ [F(τ1 ),F(τ1)].
But, unlike the previous case, when kt ∈ [F(τ1 ),F(τ1)]
c, the optimal strategy
do not change next period decisive voter from young to old. Therefore we
will additionally require that for kt ∈ [F(τ1 ),F(τ1)]
c, the value of the young
voter’s indirect utility function under the corner solutions of the ﬁrst decision
rule will be lower (or equal) to the value of the young voter’s indirect utility
function under the second decision rule, and that the aggregate saving decision
rule follows: S(kt,πt = (0,γ∗),τt+1 = 0). Since for kt ∈ [F(τ1 ),F(τ1)]
c, the
decision rule of the tax rate τt(kt) is a corner solution, the solution would imply
setting the constrained, meaning τ = τ1 or τ = τ1. Therefore the required
condition is that setting the constrained would yield that the value of the young
voter’s indirect utility function under the corner solutions of the ﬁrst decision
rule is lower (or equal) and that the aggregate saving decision rule follows:
S(kt,πt = (0,γ∗),τt+1 = 0). These conditions are suﬃcient to assure that the
equilibrium conditions are satisﬁed when: n > 0.
If the population growth rates satisfy the property: n + m < 0, there is a
majority of old in every period. It is straightforward to see that the old decisive
voter’s utility V o(γt−1,kt) is maximized by setting πt = ( Ψ
Ψ+1,1). Since the
identity of next period decisive voter’s do not change from old to young, the
aggregate saving decision rule follows: S(kt,πt = ( Ψ
Ψ+1,1),τt+1 = Ψ
Ψ+1).
7.4 A model without a social security system:
In order to emphasis the role of the social security system in the model, we next
consider a similar model with private saving, but without transfer payments
from the young to the old. We will prove that there is an equilibrium that
incorporates two strategies depending on the population growth rates. If the
immigration quota preferred by the young for its direct eﬀects on wages, is low
enough, the young decisive voter will restrict immigration even further, in order
to change next period decisive voter from young to old, so that next period old
decisive voter will set no restrictions on immigration. This policy is favorable
34because it raises the return on savings of the current young. If the immigration
quota preferred by the young, for its direct eﬀect on wages, is high enough, the
young decisive voter will not manipulate next period young to old ratio, and set
his preferable immigration quota at a level equal to the next period quota set
by next period young decisive voter. Note that since there is no social security
system, there is no additional equilibrium as in the previous model. This is due
to the fact that the "demographic steady" strategy of this equilibrium results
from the dependency of the tax rate cum beneﬁt rate on the capital per (native
born) worker, which does not exist in the present model.
The absence of social security system simpliﬁes the assumptions of the model,
as follows:
The utility of the representative young and old individuals are derived only
from their own earned income and saving,





) + βLog((1 + rt+1)st) (75)
Uo(st−1,rt,) = (1 + rt)st−1 (76)












t = wt (78)
Factor prices are determined as in the extended model.
The indirect utility of the young and old respectively can be written as
follows:
V y(kt,γt,γt+1) = A + (1 + β)Log
￿￿
(1 − α)kα























V o(γt−1,kt) = α
￿
(1 − α)kt
−Ψ(1 + γt)Ψ￿ 1−α
Ψ+α kt
￿




The deﬁnition of the Markov sub-game perfect political equilibrium is similar
to the previous deﬁnition, but has only one policy decision rule, the immigration
policy rule, γt = G(γt−1).





γt = Min[γ∗,− n
m] if γ∗ ≤ γ
γt = γ∗ otherwise
if ut(γt−1) < 1


















































The equilibrium paths depends on the population growth rates and on the
initial amount of capital per (native-born) worker the economy is endowed with.
There are four types of equilibrium paths: 1. if n > 0, there are some re-
strictions on immigration. 2. if m + n < 0, there are no restrictions on
immigration. 3. if n < 0 and m + n > 0, there are two possible equilibrium
paths: if γ∗ ≤ γ, there is a "demographic switching" equilibrium path, where
some level of immigration always prevails: in periods where the decisive voter
is old, there are no restrictions on immigration; and in periods where the deci-
sive voter is young, there are some restrictions on immigration. Otherwise, the
decisive voter is always young, and there are less restrictions on immigration
than in the "demographic switching" equilibrium path when the decisive voter is
young.
Proof. As in proposition II, we must show that the immigration policy decision
rule, G, satisﬁes the equilibrium conditions.
Consider ﬁrst the case where there is a majority of old in period t, i.e. ut ≥ 1.
It is easy to see that the V o(γt−1,kt) is maximized by setting γt = 1.
Consider next the case where there is a majority of young in period t, i.e.
ut < 1. We will prove that in the case where m+n > 0 and n < 0, the indirect
utility of the young, V y(γt−1,kt), is maximized by γt = Min[γ∗,− n
m], if γ∗ ≤ γ
and by γt = γ∗ otherwise10. As was proved in proposition II, the indirect utility
of the young subject to constant next period policy variables, is maximized by
10If the population growth rates are both positive, m,n > 0, then it is straightforward to
see that V y(γt−1,kt) is maximized by γt = γ∗.
36setting: γt = γ∗, where γ∗ ∈ [0,1]. Deﬁne γ to be the immigration quota which
satisﬁes the following property:
V y(kt,γt = −
n
m
,γt+1 = 1) = V y(kt,γt = γ,γt+1 = γ) (84a)
The indirect utility of the young voter subject to: γt+1 = Ψ(γt), can be written





L(kt) where γt+1 =
￿
Min[γ∗,− n
m] if γ∗ ≤ γ
γ∗ otherwise
if ut+1< 1
L(kt) where γt+1 = 1 otherwise
(85)
where L(kt) is deﬁned as follows:
L(kt)=

   
   
A + (1 + β)Log
￿￿
(1 − α)kα























It is easy to see that if γ∗ ≤ − n
m, then the young decisive voter will set the
current immigration quota to be γt = γ∗. Otherwise γ∗ > − n
m. If additionally
the optimal immigration quota satisfy the property: γ < γ∗, we have to prove
that the optimal strategy of the young is to set according to: γt = γ∗, which will
induce a young decisive voter in the next period voting for the same strategy,
meaning:
V y(kt,γt = −
n
m
,γt+1 = 1) < V y(kt,γt = γ∗,γt+1 = γ∗) (87a)
Using the fact the indirect utility of the young is higher the higher is next
period immigration quotas (as it increases the next period interest rate), we
derive, from equation (93), the following inequality:
V y(kt,γt = −
n
m
,γt+1 = 1) = V y(kt,γt = γ,γt+1 = γ) < V y(kt,γt = γ∗,γt+1 = γ∗)
(88a)
Thus, the optimal strategy of the young when γ∗ > − n
m and γ < γ∗ is to set
the immigration quota to be: γt = γ∗. Otherwise, if γ∗ > − n
m, but the optimal
immigration quota satisﬁes the property: γ ≥ γ∗, we must prove that the young
will set the immigration quota to be: γt = − n
m, which will induce an old decisive
voter in the next period voting for γt+1 = 1, meaning:
V y(kt,γt = −
n
m












































































































Since the derivative of k(y) by y is positive for − n
m ≤ y ≤ 1, it means that
k(γ∗) > k(− n
m). Thus, the optimal strategy of the young in that case is to set
the immigration quota to be γt = − n
m, which completes the proof.
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